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STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TIIE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
I. The effect which the nature of the considerationfor a guaranty may have in determining the question whether such promise
is or is.
not within the statute.
IN a number of American cases following the lead of the early
decision of Leonard v. Fredenburg,8 Johns. 89, KENT delivering
the opinion of the court, a rule was laid down to the effect that
where a guaranty is given upon a new consideration moving to the
promissor, the promise is not within the Statute of Frauds: Townsley v. Surnrall, 8 Pet. 182; fyers v. Morse, 15 Johns. 425;
(rpel v. Bill, 2 J. J. Marsh. 211, and cases cited in Fell on Guar.
20-22 noteq. Burge, in his work on Suretyship, relying upon 3
Kent Coin. 121-2, and cases there cited, none of which, except
Leonard v. Vredenburg, support the proposition, says: "But if
the promise to pay the debt of another arises out of some new and
original consideration of benefit or injury moving between the
zlewy-contracting parties, it is not then a case within the statute."
A distinction in this relation was taken at one time between a consideration moving to the promissor-i. e. a positive benefit to himand a loss to the promissee. See Smith on Contracts, 3 Amer. ed.
117 (* p. 47), n. 1, and some of the authorities cited infra, as
supporting the: rule of Leonard v. ,redenburg. As to this the
same arguments will 'apply as are used below against the kindred
fallacy begotten by Chancellor KENT. In Parley v. Cleveland, 4
Cow. 492 (affirmed 9 Cow. 630), the doctrine of Leonard v. Vredenburg is re-asserted. And dicta to the same effect are to be
found inthe following cases: Blount v. H7awkins, 19 Ala. 100;
Vo. XXI.-39
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McKenzie v. Jackson, 4 Ala. 230: Elder v. Trarfield, 7 Harr. &
Johns. 39; Dearbornv. Parks, 5 Greenl. 81 ; Stewart v. Campbell, 58 Me. 439; French v. Thompson, 6 Vt. 60 ; Lutz v. Adams,
7 Eng. 174; Doyle v. White, 26 Me. 341; Cooper v. Chambers,
4 Dev. 261 (this case, with French v. Thompson, is properly
determinable on the principle of Goodman v. Chase, 1 B. .& Aid.
297, which decided that a promise by the' defendant to pay the
debt of another who has been taken in execution for it on condition
of his disiharge, is not within the statute, because by the discharge
from execution the original debt is extinguished); Brown v. (Gurtiss, 2 Com. 226, cites Leonard v. Vredenbury, but comes within
the different principle of Johnson v. Gilbert, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 178,
given thus by Browne (Browne on the Statute of Frauds, § 165) :
"The common case of the holder of a third person's note assigning it for value with a guaranty.

*

*

*

The assignor owes

the assignee, and that particular mode of paying him is adopted:
he guarantees in substance his own debt." Maxwell v. Haynes,
41 Me. 659, relies on Leonard v. Vredenburg, but comes within a
different principle. See the cases collected in Farleyv. Cleveland,
and as to this latter authority see Browne, § 187. See also Jennings v. Webster, 7 Cow. 256, and lietfield v. Daw, 3 Dutcher 447.
Parsons, in his work on Contracts, Vol. II., p. 9, seems by a statement which is not very felicitously expressed to support the doctrine of Leonard v. Vredenburg ; sed vide Id. III., p. 24.
In Fell on Guaranty 20-2, a new consideration is apparently
regarded as taking the promise out of the statute: the language
is far from clear, however : vide p. 485-7, for collection of cases.
Judge SHAW, in Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete. 402, says that "1The
rule to be derived from the decisions seems to be this, that cases
are not considered as coming within the statute when the party
promising has for his object a benefit which he did not before
enjoy accruing immediately to himself." See also Curtis v. Brown,
5 Cush. 491, for another statement on this subject, by the same eminent judge, and Garnerv. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399. Allen v. Thompson, 10 N. H. 34, supports the rule of Leonard v. Jredenburg;
in upholding the verbal promise the court seemed to have assumed
that the transaction was primarily for the defendant's own benefit.
a fact which in no way appears. In Hall v. Rogers, 7 Humph.
536, the decision was rested on the doctrine of Leonard v. Fredenburg, but actually the promise was not in any sense a guaranty,
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but was a conditional payment. A. paid B. with a non-negotiable
note of C.'s, which he, A., held. He further promised by parol
that if C. did not pay the amount of the note he would. C.
proved insolvent, and B. sued A. on the verbal promise, and was held
to recover. In Hindman v. Langford, 3 Strob. 207, the promise
was to answer for the debt of a third person still continuing liable,
but was, said the couit, founded on a new and distinct consideration co-extensive with it and moving not to the third person but
to the person who made the promise. The consideration was not of
mere loss to the promissee but of benefit to the promissor himself.
The case was held to come within the principle of those which are
taken out of the statute on the ground that there was the purchase
of an interest and not a mere undertaking to pay the debt of
another. This in its mixture of truth and error seems to mark
the boundary between the earlier cases following Leonard v. redenburg, and those later ones which say that where the promissor is
put in funds to answer his guaranty, or where the original debt in
consequence of the new contract comes to relate to the promissor's
own property, the Statute of Frauds does not apply. Rite v. Wells,
17 Ill. 88, uses the language of Leonard v. Vredenburg,but so qual.
ifies it as to make it a safe definition of what may constitute an original promise. Griffin v. Derby, 5 Greenl. 476, cites the ruling of
Leonard v. Fredenburg,but was on other principles a clear case of
an original promise. Scott v. Thomas, 1 Scam. 58, by a loosely
worded dictum would also seem to confirm this doctrine; for a demonstration of whose unsoundness, see Maule v. Bucknell, 14
Wright 39; Bristow v. Silence, 4 Seld. 207; Fullamv. Adams, 4
Am. L. Reg. N. S. 460, s. c. 37 Vt. 391; Emerick v. Sanders, 1
Wis. 101 (where the learned judge who delivered the opinion does
not appear to have seen the distinction between cases of primary
and those of merely secondary position in the transaction on the
part of the person whose debt is guaranteed); Barber v. Bucklin, 2 Denio 59 ; Kingsley v. Palcolme, 4 Barb. 135 ; Hatfield v. Daw,
3 Dutch. 447; Stewart v. 0ampbell, 58 Me. 439; Lampson v.
Hobart, 28 Vt. 697; Eddy v. Roberts, 17 11. 505; Durham v.
Arledge, 1 Strob. 5; Ames v. Poster, 106 Mass. 402; Browne
Stat. of Frauds, §§ 163, 168, 207 ; Throop on Validity of Verbal
Agreem. § 592, et. seq. The doctrine of Leonard v. Trredenburg,
we may here say, when reduced to its essence amounts to this,
that whenever a guaranty is founded on a consideration it is with-
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out the Statute of Frauds ; i. e. all guaranties are without the
statute, for a guaranty, like all other contracts, if destitute of a
consideration, has no recognised legal existence.
If then all guaranties are without the statute, what subject has
that section of it, which requires written evidence of every promise to answer for the debt, &c., of another, to operate upon ? If
there is any distinction to be taken in this connection between a
consideration which consists in benefit to promissor and that which
consists in a loss to the promissee, it is for those who make the
assertion to show. it: none is apparent. See Stewart v. Campbell for a collection of cases which hold those guaranties to be
without the statute which are made in consideration of funds
placed in the promissor's hands. See Olmstead v. Greenly, 18
John. 12; Stoudt v. Hine, 45 Pa. St. 30 (with cases cited); and
Jack v. Morrison, 48 Pa. St. 113, to the same effect. See also
McKenzie v. Jackson, 4 Ala. 230 ; Hilton v. Dinsmore, 21 Me.
410 ; Todd v. Tobey, 29 Me. 219 ; -Elwoodv. Mann, 5 Wend. 235;
lindman v. Langford, 3 Strob. 207; Lee v. Fontaine, 10 Ala.
755; Hall v. Rogers, 7 Humph. 536; Wait v. Wait, 28 Vt. 350;
Stanley v. Hendricks, 13 Ired. 86 (citing Dranghm v. Bunting, 9 Ired. 10) ; Eddy v. Roberts, 17 Ill. 505; Drakely v. DeForest, 3 Conn. 272; Jlymer v. DeYoung, 54 Pa. St. 118. Whitcomb v. .Kephart,50 Pa. St. 85, is as follows: A. gave a contract
of labor to B., B. gave a sub-contract to C.; B., C. and D. (the
latter, the paying agent of A., but not contracting as such), upon
difficulties arising, agreed that C. should go on with his work, and
that D. should pay him the amount of the original sub-contract
price, deducting, however, the amount of any payments made by
B. D., whose consideration was the trade which he drove with
the employees of the contractors, was to reimburse himself out of
the funds which A. from time to time advanced him to pay B.
The court, though regarding this as an absolute promise on D.'s
part. and one not confined to the funds placed in his hands, yet
held the Statute of Frauds not to apply. In fact the funds were
suiieit to meet the claim of C., the plaintiff. There seems to
.havo b .ci 'io privily between A. and C., in either the original or
the .,ubs,.,quent coitr;ct. See, however, Shoemaker v. King, 40
Pa. St. 107. A. and B., a firm, conveyed partnership property
to C., who promised to pay the firm debts. D., a partnership
creditor, not party t, this arrangement, .,u-'d C. The Statute of
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Frauds was held a good defence, A.'s and B.'s liability continuing
to subsist. See also Furbish v. Goodnow, 98 Mass. 106, which
seems to decide that the receipt by tile defendant, from-the debtor
answered for, of a consideration sufficient to cover the debt guaranteed will net alone take the promise out of the statute, but that
this consideration must have been especially made a fund out of
which the guaranty was to be met and to which the liability was to
be confined. See Malleril v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412, where Jackson
v. Ra!ynor, 12 John. 291, relied upon in Furbishv. Goodnow, was
thought to have gone too far. For a very able discussion of this
point see Throop .Index "Fund").
The true principle, it is conceived, is that ordinarily if the
person whose debt is guaranteed still remains liable, the promise
to answer for such debt should be in 'writing. But that if the
giving of the guaranty was to accomplish a purpose of the guarantor's, and the payment of the third person's debt was subsidiary and
incidental to this, the fact of such payment need riot make the undertaking less an original one on the promissor's part. See the
language of SifAw, C. J., in Nelson v. Boy/nton, quoted above. See
Parsons on Contracts, III., p. 24. Mr. Throop (Val. of Verb. Agr..
§ 615) combats this proposition in the more unqualified form in
which it is usually stated as amounting to the doctrine of Leonard
v. ' 2redenburg, and says of it that its extended recognition has been
due to the frequency of cases where it practically coincides with
the well-settled principle that the statute does not apply when the.
substance of the promise is an engagement to pay the promissor's
own debt or one resting on his property. As to this see the two re-cent cases of Tallman v. Bressler, 65 Barb. 378, and Holmes Y.
Kearns, 40 Ind. 124. See to the same effect Browne on St..of:
Fr., § 214. See, however, Roberts on the St. of Fr. (Am. ed. 1823)
pp. 23, 29. It may be questioned, however, whether :Throop's
firmula is'not too narrow, and whether such a case as for example
Lampson v. Hobart, 28 Vt. 697, condemned by him, is not in confornity with a liberal view of that common-sense enactment, the
F~atute of Frauds. The plaintiff, in Lanmpson v. Hobart, had &
claim against H. & D. which he was about to secure by an attachmerit of their property, when the defendant who had against If. &
D. a larger claim than the plaintiff, promised that if the plaintiff
would not attach and make costs, he, the defendaft, would, pay to
the plaintiff the debt of I. & D. The plaintiff forbore and as.
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sisted the defendant in securing the latter's debt by an attachment.
The court, per REDFIELD, J., comparing this case to that of the
surrender of a lien, held it a new contract the interest of which was
chiefly to the defendant, and though H. & D. remained liable to
the plaintiff, the defendant's promise was an original one and not
,within the Statute of Frauds. It is tobe noted that the defendant's
engagement seems to have been absolute in form, yet as there can
be no doubt that if the plaintiff had got the amount from H. & D.
the defendant would have been discharged, the latter substantially
answered for H. & D.'s failure to pay. It comes now to be rather
a question of words than anything else, but it must again be said
of Mr. Throop's statement that it is somewhat narrow and possibly
calculated to mislead. It is narrow in that it excludes cases where
though the debt guaranteed cannot fairly be said to be the promissor's own, or one resting on his property, the uhole transaction in
which the guaranty plays a minor part, may eminently be his, he,
as it happens, being the person carrying the affair on. Ordinary
good sense would be apt to hold an engagement like that in
lampson v. Hobart, to be in kind as well as degree different from
a guaranty, and to say that it would be absurd to give it the protection of an act which was to apply to liabilities for the indebtedness of others. It is also to be considered whether the definition,
"a promise to pay the promissor's own debt in substance or one
resting on his property," is the proper way of describing such an
engagement. That this is not technically such a promise is not
open to dispute, and it is for the student to consider whether the
words "in substance" are wide enough in their natural meaning
to comprehend such a case as the above, and whether a broader if
more indefinite definition is not here necessary to fulfil the spirit
of the Statute of Frauds. Mr. Throop cites and mainly relies on
in support of his view the cases of Maule v. Iricknell and .Fullam
v. Adams. The language of the former, however, as will be seen,
is much wider than our author's, as for example, the following:
"And as the cases referred to show it" (the promise to answer
for the debt of another) "may be unaffected by the statute though
the original debt remains, if the promissor has received a fund, &c.,
for the payment of the debt. But except in such cases and others
perhaps of a kindred nature in which the contract shows an intention of the partiesthat the new promisoor shall become theprincipal
debtor and the old debtor become but secondarily liable, the rule,
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&c.," is that while the old debt remains the promise is within the
statute. Judge STRONG, it is true, goes on to say that in a majority
of such cases there was some liability of the promissor or his property, independent of his express promise (see Fish v. Thomas, 5
Gray 45, and Arnold v. Steadman, 8upra), which is certainly the
fact, and should always be stated in qualification of what we hold
the more practical rule, which is after all only a little more comprehensive statement of Mr. Throop's own doctrine. Fullam v.
Adams refutes Leonard v. Vredenburg, and the position taken in
Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412, viz. that "A., for any consideration agreed upon between him and B., may verbally undertake
that 0. shall pay his debt to B." The learned Judge POLAi,
who delivered the opinion of the court in Fullam v. Adams,
goes on to lay down a rule much more restricted than Throop's
own. " We believe," he said, "it will be found that in all cases
regarded as sound, where it has been held that a parol promise to
pay the debt of another is binding, the promissor held in his hands
funds, securities or property devoted to the payment of the debt,
and his promise to pay, attached upon his obligation or duty growing out of the receipt of such fund."
A promise, for example, by one wishing to purchase a chattel
subject to a lien, that if the lien-creditor will release the lien so
that the promissor may acquire,, with the purpose perhaps of transmitting, an absolute title, he, the intending purchaser, will answer
for the lien-debtor's debt: or a promise by one having his goods
'mingled wi'h those of a judgment-debtor's, that if the judgmentcreditor will not issue execution, he, the promissor, will answer for
such debt, do not in strictness fall within Mr. Throop's language,
and yet are certainly very different from ordinary guaranties. In
Hop kinson v Davis, 5 Phila. 147, the defendant was interested in
A.'s business, and in consideration of the plaintiff's forbearing to
sue A. guaranteed A.'s note, the Statute of Frauds was held not to
apply; HARE, J., saying: "Besides, the weight of authority would
seem to be that when a promise to be answerable for the debt of
another is based not only upon a new consideration but upon a
consideration which moves to and benefits the promissor by inducing delay in the institution of proceedings, that might otherwise
sweep away his property or break up a business in which he is interested, the obligation is in fact his own debt, notwithstanding its
form, and consequently not within the Statute of Frauds." In
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the actual case the consideration of the note was work done upon
A.'s shop, but it does not appear how far, if at all, the defendant's
interest in A.'s business could have made him liable for the value
of the work. The point for the jurist's consideration is whether
or not it would be better to look at the whole transaction between
the parties, and if it be in realifty an original one between them,
then to hold that the mere fact that a guaranty is the pivot upon
which it turns should be no reason for drawing it within the operation of the Statute of Frauds. As to Lanipson v. Hobart, see
WTaldo v. Emerson, 13 Mich. 396, directly opposite in its ruling.
II. Under what circumstawes other than those already considered, the original liability of the person ivhose debt isansweredfor
in a guaranty continuing to subsist, the Statute of Frauds is held
not to apply.
We have seed' that where the guarantor is put in funds, and
where the transaction is his own, the verbal promise has been decided to be valid, though the original liability of the person answered for did not cease to exist. There is a further class of cases
where there is a double liability, but where the statute is nevertheless considered not to apply, on the ground that the two obligors
are to be considered rather as joint-debtors than as collaterally
bound, and it is this class that we now propose to examine. In
Gibbs Y. Blanchard, 15 Mich. 299, assumpsit for the price of a
mare on the common counts against D. and G., the following charge
was held correct, that "if it was the understanding of the parties
that D. was the purchaser, that he should give his note to the
plaihtiff for the price and that G. should sign so as to be liable as
endorser, the plaintiff must fail" (no such endorsement was made
in fact). "If, however, the understanding of the parties was at the
time that G. and D. were the buyers of the mare, and that both were
to be liable as purchasers for the purchase-price and accordingly
should become joint-makers of a promnssory note for its payment,
though D. was less relied upon by the plaintiff than G., and though
in point of fact it was understood that the mare when bought
should belong to D., the plaintiff is entitled to recover." - Vide Swift
v. Pierce, 13 Allen 136, for a converse proposition. See Rowe v.
Whittier, 21 Me. 550 ; Ware v. Stephenson, 10 Leigh 167 ; Noyes
v. Humphreys, 11 Grattan 636; Curtis v. Brown, 5 Cush. 491;
Cutler y. Ilinton, 6 Randolph 509 ; M11atthews v. Mfilton, 4 Yerger
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. 576; Tileston, v. Nettleton, 6 Pick. 509; Skinner v. Conant, 20
Vt. 453; Larson v. 1ynzan, 14 Wend. 246; Kurtz v. Adams,
7 Eng. 174; Payne v. Baldwin, 14 Barb. 570; Peabody v. Harvey, 4 Conn. 119, for a consideration of the general proposition
that where there is a subsisting !iability on the part of the person
answered for, such promise to answer is a guaranty and within the
statute. In Wainright v. Straw, 15 Vt. 275, S. and C. came to the
plaintiff's agent and said that they wanted to buy a stove for S.,
but that both would be responsible, and on the joint responsibility
the agent sold the stove: C.'s promise held to be original. In
Bshelman v. Beecher, 6 Leg. Gaz. 220, Supreme Court of Penna.,
a promise was made by C. to A. that if A. would hasten to finish
work lie was doing for B., he, C., would settle for what would be
due on the account. A., who had previously charged the goods to
B., now charged them to B. & Co., meaning thereby to include C.
The Statute of Frauds held to apply. C. would seem, however, to
have been a principal and to have had an interest in the transaction.
In a number of cases will be found the bald statement that when-'
ever the whole credit is not given to the party sought to be charged
he is a guarantor and his engagement must be evidenced by a.
writing. A doctrine which is open to great exception, as will be
seen by a reference'to the note to Birkmyer v. Darnell,1 Smith's
Lead. Cas., Hare & Wallace's notes, Vol. I., Part 1.
An analysis of the authorities cited for thip proposition will show
that the contracts respectively in question were clearly guaranties
for other reasons than the one just given. In Rogers v. Kneeland,
13 Wend. 121, the ruling was obiter dictum. In Calillv. Bigelow,
18 Pick. 869, the goods whose payment was answered for were
charged in the first instance to the principal only and not to the
surety. Brady v. Sackrider, 1 Sand. 515; Elder v. Warfield, 7
Harr. & J. 397; "aylor v. Drake, 4 Strob. 431 ; Liland v. Crpgan, 1 McCord 100; Smith v. Montgomery, 3 Tex. 199, and
Garville v. Crane, 5 Hill 483, are in the same category as Cahill
v. Bigelow. In Blake v. Parlin,22 Me. 395, and .loses v. rorton, 36 Me. -113, a piece of real property was leased to one and
the rent abswered for by the defendant. In Aldrich v. .Tewell,
12 Vt. 126, the defendant told the plaintiff that if lie would work
for A., he, the defendant, would pay him, if A. did not. In Smith
v..H'yde, 19 Vt. 56, the plaintiff rendered services to A., at his,
A.'s, request and upon his credit; while doing so B. agreed "to
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be holden" to the plaintiff for these services. The court cited
Barber v. Fox, 2 E. C. L. 386, for the doctrine that if the whole
credit was not given to the party answering for another, the engagement was collateral (no authority for the statement). In The
Proprietorsv. Abbot, 14 N. H. 159, the court said that under the
authority of Holmes v. Knight,'10 N. H. 177, they would be
"obliged to follow this doctrine, but that the case before them did
not call for its application. In Holme8 v. Knight, a dictum goes
to the full extent of saying that if any credit is given to the person
answered for the promise must be in writing, but deprecates, as
well it might, an extreme application of such a rule. Eddy, v.
Roberts, 17 Ill. 505, is not, in spite of its syllabus, an authority for
the unqualified doctrine that in all cases of subsisting liability on
the part of the third person whose debt is answered for, the Statute
of Frauds applies. "If," says STORY, J., in Townaley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 182, "A. says to B., pay so much money to C. and I
will repay you, it is an original independent promise. * * *
And damage to the promissee constitutes as good a consideration
as benefit to the promissor." "If," says the same judge, in D' Wolf
v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 500, "A. agrees to advance B. a'sum of money
for which B. is to be answerable, but at the same time it is expressed that 0. will do some act for the security of A., and enter
into an agreement with A. for that purpose, it would scarcely
seem a case of mere collateral undertaking, but rather, if one might
use the phrase, a, trilateral contract * * *.
The credit is not
given solely to either but to both, not as joint contractors in the
same contract but as separate contractors upon co-existing contracts
forming part of the same general transaction."
How far this refinement is sound or useful, there exist, it is believed, no adjudged
cases to show. Gibbs v. Blanchard, 15 Mich. 299, and Wainwright v. Straw, 15 Vt. 275, are cases of joint-contract. For authority supporting these two cases see Nelson v. -Dubois, 13 John.
175, where the following contract was held to be original, viz. A.,
at C.'s request, sold a horse to B. and took B.'s note endorsed by
C. B. was a minor with little property, and the note when due
was presented to C., who promised to pay it. The court cited and
relied on Hunt v. Adams, 5 Mass. 358, and White v. Howland, 9
Mass. 314.
HENRY REED.

